THE RESPONSE OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO REVIEW COMMITTEE



ON THE OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

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APRIL 1987

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RESPONSE OF THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

SELECTION OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

1. Members of Metropolitan Council be chosen by a method of direct election. (p. 7)

2. The method of direct election to Metropolitan Council be such that representatives chosen by the electorate sit only on Metropolitan Council. (p. 9)

3. The mayors of the area municipalities be included in the representation to the Metropolitan Council. (p. 9)

THE SIZE OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

4. The size of Metropolitan Council be based on an average representation by population ratio of one directly elected councillor per 75,000 population, that the size of Metropolitan Council, including the mayors, be 34 and the representation from each area municipality be as follows: (p. 14)

Municipality	Number of Metropolitan Council Members Including Mayors
Toronto	9
North York	8
Etobicoke	5
Scarborough	7
York	3
East York	2
	34

5. Local councils review the potential for appropriate reductions in their own sizes should Metropolitan Council adopt the recommendation for a smaller Metropolitan Council size. (p. 15)

ELECTORAL WARD BOUNDARIES

6. Electoral ward boundaries for Metropolitan Toronto purposes be configured to attain a population of 75,000 ± 25%, should not cross municipal boundaries and should combine existing wards wherever possible. (p. 17)

SELECTION OF THE METROPOLITAN CHAIRMAN

7. The Metropolitan Chairman be chosen by Metropolitan Council from among its directly elected Members and that the Chairman retain his Metropolitan seat. (p. 23)

8. The mayors of the area municipalities not be eligible to serve as the Chairman of Metropolitan Toronto. (p. 23)

SELECTION OF THE METROPOLITAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

9. The method of selecting the Metropolitan Executive Committee be such that it comprise the Metropolitan Chairman, the six area municipal mayors and the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of Metropolitan Council. (p. 29)

10. The term of office for standing committee chairmen be changed from the existing one-year's duration to three years. (p. 30)

11. Metropolitan Council establish two new standing committees of Council; a Finance Committee and a Management Committee to replace the Budget and Management Sub-Committees of the Executive Committee. (p. 31)

RELATIONSHIP OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS TO METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

12. the Metropolitan Council adopt the principle that special purpose bodies of the Metropolitan Corporation be more accountable to the Metropolitan Council. (p. 36)

13. the Metropolitan Council authorize the Metropolitan Review Committee to undertake an in-depth analysis of special purpose bodies to include, but not be limited to, the following areas;

    (a) an increase in the membership of those bodies which take up a large portion of the Metropolitan budget, with a majority of the members being Members of Council;

    (b) the potential for reducing the number of special purpose bodies by integrating them into the Metropolitan Corporation;

    (c) a review of administrative procedures relating to tenders and proposal calls and rules of procedure for the conduct of public meetings; and

    (d) submit recommendations thereon to Council. (p. 39)

14. The Minister of Municipal Affairs be requested to meet with the Metropolitan Review Committee for the purpose of discussing Council's recommendations on Council's desired relationship with special purpose bodies and jointly identify the legislative changes to give effect thereto. (p. 40)

CHANGES REQUIRED TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO ACT

15. **Metropolitan Council authorize the Metropolitan Review Committee to meet with the Minister of Municipal Affairs, to discuss the recommendations contained in this report and jointly identify and review the legislative changes required to give effect thereto. (p. 41)**

1. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Metropolitan Toronto Review Committee (the Review Committee) was established to provide a response to the Minister of Municipal Affairs regarding the options identified for the Government of Metropolitan Toronto in the Report of the Task Force on Representation and Accountability in Metropolitan Toronto (the Task Force)[1]. In its Report, the Task Force developed a range of options concerning topics fundamental to the structure and operation of Metropolitan Council. These topics include:

- Selection of Metropolitan Council
- Size of Metropolitan Council
- Electoral Ward Boundaries
- Selection of the Metropolitan Chairman
- Selection of the Metropolitan Executive Committee
- Relationship of Metropolitan Council to Boards and Commissions

While the Task Force performed in an advisory capacity to the Minister and did not recommend any specific options for Metropolitan Council to pursue, it did provide an evaluation of the options measured against the criteria of accountability, representation and responsiveness. The Review Committee was struck to analyze the Task Force's Report and to recommend an appropriate combination of options for the Government of Metropolitan Toronto. The options recommended in this report provide for a Metropolitan Council which will ensure the desired accountability, representation and responsiveness of its members to the electorate.

The Review Committee has prepared a response within a timeframe which permits sufficient debate of the Review Committee's recommendations at Metropolitan Council and the preparation of a response to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, targetted for the end of April 1987.

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1 Task Force on Representation and Accountability in Metropolitan Toronto, Analysis and Options for the Government of Metropolitan Toronto, November 1986.

Metro Review Committee
Range of Options, Assumptions, Related Issues and Evaluation Criteria

Selection of Metro Council	Selection of Metro Chairman	Metro's Executive Committee	Relationship of Metro Council to Boards & Commissions
1. Indirect Election (Status Quo) • Mayors 6 • Controllers 14 • Joint Seats 11 • Council appointees 8(12*)	1. Appointment by Council (Status Quo) • Chosen by Metro Council • Members of Council or "any other person" eligible • Chairman must resign seat • Incumbent Chairman eligible	1. The Status Quo • Composition specified by statute • 14 members: - Chairman - Mayors - Top polling controllers Etobicoke (1) North York (2) Scarborough (1) - 3 Metro Councillors from City of Toronto	1. The Status Quo • Municipal • Provincial/municipal • Hybrid
2. Direct Election (Metro-only) • Metro councillors only • Mayors, controllers Area Councillors excluded • Independent election process	2. Selection from Metro Council (retain seat) • Chosen from among Council members • Chairman retains seat • Incumbent must win election to Metro Council to be eligible	2. Selection of Executive Committee by Chairman • Selected by Chairman from among Council members • Required by statute • Size provided by statute	2. Greater Independence • Responsibilities entirely separate from Metro • Metro Council only appoints or reappoints • No Metro Council members • All citizen members
3. Direct Election (Metro-only) plus mayors • Metro councillors only • Mayors	3. At-large Election • any qualified elector	3. Selection of Executive Committee by Metro Council • Selected by Council from among its members • Required by Statute • Size provided by Statute	3. Greater Council control • Administrative agencies of Metro Corporation • Theme of Task Force on Functional Relationships..."
4. Joint Seat (Dual Representation) • City of Toronto model • Mayors • Metro Councillors serve on both Councils			
Related Issues: • Electoral Boundaries • Size of Metro Council • Size of Area Councils		• Eligibility of Mayors • Standing Committees	• Local Hydro Commission • Police Commission • T.T.C.
Evaluation Criteria: • Accountability • Representation • Relationship between Metro and Area Councils	• Accountability • Representation • Nature of Chairmanship	• Accountability • Representation • Relationship to Metro Council	• Accountability • Representation • Council Control

* Current Council size is 39, excluding Chairman. Bill 114 proposes 43 - 4 added to be Council appointees

In its deliberations, the Review Committee examined the arguments regarding the options presented in the Task Force's Report as shown in Exhibit 1. In addition, the Review Committee reviewed the results of a survey of all members of Metropolitan Council on most of these issues (see Appendix A). A summary of the responses to the questionnaire is contained in Appendix B. Furthermore, the Review Committee reflected upon the comments and concerns presented by its own members. A synthesis of these three sources of information provided the basis for the response formulated by the Review Committee. Finally, a list of the primary changes required to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act to effect the recommendations contained herein, should they be adopted, is contained in Appendix C.

The Review Committee is comprised of the following members of Metropolitan Council:

C. D. Flynn (Review Committee Chairman)	Metropolitan Chairman
R. Kanter	Councillor, Toronto
J. Rowlands	Councillor, Toronto
M. Lastman	Mayor, North York
L. Griffin	Councillor, Etobicoke
M. Prinsloo	Councillor, Scarborough
A. Tonks	Mayor, York
D. Johnson	Mayor, East York

2. SELECTION OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

2.1 Models Reviewed

In its Report, the Task Force examined two basic models for the selection of Council. The two models are **indirect election** (status quo) and **direct election.** Under the direct election model, three variations have been analyzed by the Review Committee. These are: direct election (Metro-only), direct election (Metro-only) plus mayors and joint seat (dual representation). With the **indirect election** model, the mayors and members of Boards of Control serve on Metropolitan Council by virtue of their election to office at the local level. The exception to this, in the present system, is the City of Toronto whereby representatives who have been elected as Metropolitan councillors serve on both Metropolitan Council and Toronto Council. The balance of membership at Metropolitan Council is selected by area councils from amongst their own members, the total of which is governed by Section 5 of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act.

The basic principle of the **direct election** model is that the electorate directly elects representatives to sit on Metropolitan Council. Three variations of direct election were considered by the Review Committee.

Metro-Only Representation - Elected representatives would serve exclusively on Metropolitan Council. The mayors and area councillors, including members of Boards of Control, would not serve on Metropolitan Council. The election of Metropolitan councillors would be independent of arrangements for the election and composition of area councils.

Metro-Only Representation Plus the Mayors - In addition to the Metropolitan councillors who would be elected to serve exclusively on Metropolitan Council, as above, the mayors would also serve on Metropolitan Council.

EXHIBIT 2

OPTIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF METRO COUNCIL


INDIRECT MODEL
DIRECT MODEL
JOINT SEAT OPTION:
SERVE ON BOTH METRO AND LOCAL COUNCILS
METRO ONLY OPTION:
SERVE ON METRO COUNCIL ONLY
DIRECT ELECTION (METRO ONLY) EXCLUDING MAYORS
DIRECT ELECTION (METRO ONLY) INCLUDING MAYORS

Joint Seat (Dual Representation) - All Metropolitan councillors would be elected directly to Metropolitan Council, but would also sit on their respective local councils. The mayors would also serve on Metro Council. The members of area council Executive Committees (Boards of Control) would no longer serve on Metropolitan Council.

An outline of the above options that were deliberated by the Review Committee is shown in Exhibit 2.

2.2 Direct vs. Indirect Election

The majority of the Review Committee members expressed dissatisfaction with the existing indirect election system. The Review Committee's view was that this system did not satisfactorily meet the criteria identified in the Report of the Task Force; namely, accountability, representation and responsiveness. Indirect election offers neither direct accountability to the electorate nor direct representation of the electorate. With this system, representation to Metropolitan and local councils, as well as their respective issues, are unclear to the electorate.

Under indirect election, Metropolitan representatives tend to be preoccupied with local matters by virtue of being elected to local area councils. The Review Committee believed that this has the potential to prevent representatives from devoting sufficient time to Metropolitan issues. Throughout its deliberations, the Review Committee identified the need for Metropolitan Council to assert a more unified position in its negotiations with the provincial government and surrounding regional municipalities. The complexity and magnitude of issues, such as Network 2011, Market Value Assessment, Dome Stadium and Future Uses of Exhibition Place require greater policy-making, priority setting efforts and time from Metropolitan representatives.

While the indirect election model provides formal linkages between Metropolitan and local area councils, the line of communication is often biased towards parochial concerns which prevail over Metropolitan-wide issues. The viewpoint that many Metropolitan representatives bring to Metropolitan Council is often the view cultivated by area councils.

The Review Committee indicated a strong need to minimize parochialism in Metropolitan affairs and to provide Metropolitan councillors with more time from their local responsibilities in order to more fully involve them in Metropolitan issues. It is believed that a direct election model would address these concerns. Under direct election, Metropolitan representatives would be given the direct responsibility of representing the electorate on issues of Metropolitan-wide interest, thereby enhancing accountability. Parochial concerns would be reduced through the direct representation of the electorates' concerns on Metropolitan issues, instead of representation of the area councils' positions on similar issues. Metropolitan representatives would have more time to devote to Metropolitan matters because they would be relieved of local responsibilities (depending on which direct election option is selected) which would contribute towards greater consensus building at the Metropolitan level. During elections, voter recognition of what the Metropolitan issues are and who decides them would be enhanced.

The Review Committee considers the establishment of direct election as a vital step towards forging a more visible profile for Metropolitan Toronto and the acknowledgement of the important role that it plays in the lives of its residents. Certainly, a government responsible for a $1.7 billion budget should be clearly identified to the electorate. The results of the survey indicated that two-thirds of those responding favour some form of direct election of Metropolitan Council Members.

It is therefore recommended that:

1. **Members of Metropolitan Council be chosen by a method of direct election.**

2.3. The Method of Direct Election

There are two main ways of implementing direct election for Metropolitan Toronto: representation on Metropolitan Council only and joint seat representation (Metropolitan and local councils). The first of these constitutes directly electing Metropolitan representatives who would serve only on Metropolitan Council and deal exclusively with Metropolitan issues.

The second involves directly electing Metropolitan representatives who would serve on both Metropolitan and local councils and deal with both Metro-wide and local issues. As indicated in the survey results, members of Metropolitan Council were evenly divided on choosing between these two options for direct election. After considerable evaluation of the merits of both options, the Review Committee favoured the Metro-only method.

The joint seat option is dismissed by the Review Committee primarily because it would prolong the Metropolitan representative's involvement in local matters. It is noted that the joint seat model offers greater clarity over the current model, in terms of the Metropolitan representative's accountability to the electorate on Metropolitan issues. The joint seat format also provides formal linkages between Metropolitan and local councils via the double council representation. Nonetheless, the joint seat model has the potential to cause competition and conflict in local issues between the local council representative and the joint seat representative in the same ward. The joint seat representatives would not be elected to serve exclusively on Metropolitan Council and invariably, would devote some portion of their time to local issues. The Review Committee viewed the joint seat model as a modification of the status-quo instead of furthering the development of Metropolitan government as a distinct policy and decision-making body whose members are given a direct mandate by the electorate to focus solely on Metropolitan issues.

A Metro-only model offers many highly desirable features which would present a more vibrant image of Metropolitan Toronto to the electorate. Accountability to and representation of the electorate would be clearly defined as councillors are directly elected to Metropolitan Council and focus exclusively on Metropolitan issues. Parochial concerns would be largely reduced as a result of the accountability of Metropolitan representatives to the electorate and not to the local councils. Elections would be simplified and would enforce the one person/one vote principle. Overall, the Metro-only option would allow for the wholesale independence of Metropolitan Council in its policy and decison-making initiatives.

It is therefore recommended that:

2. **The method of direct election to Metropolitan Council be such that representatives chosen by the electorate sit only on Metropolitan Council.**

2.4 Include or Exclude the Mayors

The final decision to be made in deciding on the form of direct election is whether to include or exclude the mayors from sitting on Metropolitan Council. In their response to the questionnaire, an overwhelming majority of Metropolitan Council Members indicated that the mayors should be included in a direct election format.

While the Review Committee believed it was essential that the Metropolitan councillors be directly elected and serve on Metropolitan Council only, the majority believed that some linkage to the local councils was also essential. The position of the Review Committee was that the mayors would provide this essential linkage between Metropolitan and local councils.

It is therefore recommended that:

3. **The mayors of the area municipalities be included in the representation to the Metropolitan Council.**

2.5 Conclusion

The Review Committee summarized the arguments in favour of its preferred option (direct election of Metro-only council members plus the mayors) for the selection of Metropolitan Council as measured against the evaluation criteria established by the Task Force, as follows:

Accountability: The direct election of Metro-only councillors plus mayors option would essentially reduce the amount of parochialism in Metropolitan Council and foster a greater Metropolitan perspective. Directly elected Metropolitan councillors would be accountable only to their electorate and not to any local council. During elections, the electorate would be able to differentiate more clearly between Metropolitan and local representatives, as Metropolitan issues could be contested separately from local issues. This delineation would certainly enhance the electorates' recognition of the type of responsibilities assigned to each level of government.

Although the direct election plus mayors option would project a visible image for Metropolitan Toronto, it would not promote this recognition at the expense of severing ties with the area councils if the mayors were excluded. The presence of the mayors on Metropolitan Council would provide some degree of local area representation by virtue of the mayors' accountability to the local area electorate and councils. The direct election plus mayors option promotes the tenet of greater accountability of Metropolitan councillors to the electorate, while still providing for some local council accountability by virtue of the mayors' positions on Metropolitan Council.

Representation: Under the direct election plus mayors option, Metropolitan councillors would remain completely free to address Metropolitan issues without regard to local council matters. This situation would provide Metropolitan councillors with the opportunity to focus on those issues impacting all of Metropolitan Toronto and would allow Metropolitan Council to become a more effective vehicle for articulating a Metropolitan Toronto

position on those issues of an inter-regional or provincial context. The presence of the mayors would impart some representation of local councils at Metropolitan Council. However, it is noted that the amount of time that mayors can devote to Metropolitan issues is constrained by virtue of their involvement with local councils.

Responsiveness: Both Metropolitan Council and the area councils would be linked via the mayors under the direct election plus mayors option. Although directly elected Metropolitan councillors would be involved with issues of Metro-wide interest, they could be informed of the positions of the local councils in these matters through the mayors. The majority of the Metropolitan representatives agreed with the view that the mayors would best serve as conduits of information between Metropolitan Toronto and area councils. The recommended model offers the best of both worlds in terms of responsiveness. Metropolitan Council would be more responsive to the electorate on Metro-wide issues through its directly elected members and would also remain responsive to local concerns through the mayors.

3. THE SIZE OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

3.1 Metropolitan Review Committee Position on Metropolitan Council Size

Concern was expressed by the Review Committee and clearly indicated in the Metropolitan councillors' responses to the questionnaire that Metropolitan Council's current size is too large. The Review Committee believed that a smaller-sized Council would facilitate consensus and deal with Metropolitan issues in a more efficient manner. While recognizing that a smaller Metropolitan Council would require the redistribution of the existing workload among fewer members, the Review Committee noted that these would be full-time members and no increase in workload should result. In fact, the end result would be that more time would be devoted to Metropolitan issues.

The preference for a smaller, more "manageable" Metropolitan Council was indicated by the majority of Metropolitan councillors. In the survey, only one-third of the Members of Council preferred the current representation by population ratio of one elected representative for every 50,000 people. The majority of Members of Council indicated a preference for a representation by population ratio of one elected representative for every 75,000 persons.

There was a slight preference indicated for excluding the mayors when calculating the representation by population ratio. Under a direct election plus mayors format, a 1:75,000 ratio would produce a Metropolitan Council consisting of 34 members; 28 directly elected Metropolitan councillors and the six mayors. According to this arrangement, representation by area municipality to Metropolitan Council would be as shown in Exhibit 3.

The proposed distribution does not radically differ from the current level of representation for each area municipality at Metropolitan Council and ensures that each area municipality is represented by at least one directly elected Metropolitan councillor, in addition to the mayor. The Review Committee believes that a Metropolitan Council with 34 members would still enable Metropolitan Council to effectively perform its assigned duties.

EXHIBIT 3

EXISTING AND PROPOSED REPRESENTATION

ON

METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

	EXISTING				PROPOSED	
Municipality	Current Metro Rep.	Population Per Metro Rep.[1]	Proposed Bill 114	Population Per Metro Rep.	Directly Elected Councillors Plus Mayors	Population Per Metro Rep.[2]
TORONTO	12	50,375	12	50,375	9	75,563
NORTH YORK	10	56,631	11	50,574	8	79,473
ETOBICOKE	5	59,698	6	49,749	5	74,623
SCARBOROUGH	7	65,994	9	51,329	7	76,993
YORK	3	44,619	3	44,619	3	66,928
EAST YORK	2	48,840	2	48,840	2	97,928
TOTAL	39		43		34	

1. Task Force on Representation and Accountability in Metropolitan Toronto, Analysis and Options for the Government of Metropolitan Toronto, November 1986, Table 5-B, p.53.

2. Calculation does not include mayors.

It is therefore recommended that:

4. **The size of Metropolitan Council be based on an average representation by population ratio of one directly elected councillor per 75,000 population, that the size of Metropolitan Council, including the mayors, be 34 and the representation from each area municipality be as follows:**

Municipality	Number of Metropolitan Council Members Including Mayors
Toronto	9
North York	8
Etobicoke	5
Scarborough	7
York	3
East York	2
	34

3.2 Impact of Metropolitan Council Size on Local Area Council Size

Of concern to the Review Committee was the effect of a smaller Metropolitan Council size on the size of area councils. The Review Committee's position is that local area councils should not become any larger in size. In fact, under a direct election plus mayors format, local area councils may consider a possible reduction in their size. Under a 1:75,000 representation ratio, the direct election plus mayors format would add 28 new directly elected representatives to the existing body of 96 local representatives throughout Metropolitan Toronto. By virtue of definition of direct election plus mayors, the new Metropolitan representatives will be exclusively devoted to Metropolitan issues, thereby eliminating the need for local representation at Metropolitan Council, with the exception of the mayors. Similarly, this will leave all members of local area councils, with the exception of the mayors, to focus solely on local issues which could conceivably reduce their workload.

Ultimately, it must be the decision of the local area councils whether or not to reduce their own council size as the result of a smaller-sized Metropolitan Council.

It is therefore recommended that:

5. **Local councils review the potential for appropriate reductions in their own sizes should Metropolitan Council adopt the recommendation for a smaller Metropolitan Council size.**

4. ELECTORAL WARD BOUNDARIES

For Metropolitan Toronto purposes, the number and size of electoral wards are contingent upon the size of Metropolitan Council. The Review Committee has recommended that a Metropolitan Council size of 34 would represent an optimal size given one directly elected representative for every 75,000 persons. The proposed Metropolitan Council size would require some reconfiguration of electoral ward boundaries.

4.1 Metropolitan Review Committee Position on Electoral Ward Boundaries

The Review Committee identified that for Metropolitan Toronto purposes, electoral ward boundaries should not cross municipal boundaries. The large majority of Members of Council agreed with this position and furthermore, indicated that if electoral wards need to be reconfigured, it should be accomplished by combining existing wards. Nearly three-quarters of Metropolitan representatives agreed that existing ward boundaries should be redrawn in the event that the combination of existing wards does not achieve the 75,000 population target. Should ward boundaries be redrawn, an allowance in variation of plus or minus 25 percent which is similar to provincial and federal guidelines for determining electoral districts, should be adopted.

The Review Committee's recommendations for the selection of Metropolitan Council based on a direct election plus mayors format and a Metropolitan Council size of 34 comprised of 28 councillors voted directly to Metropolitan Council and the six mayors, could be accommodated without electoral ward boundaries having to cross municipal boundaries. Where reconfiguration of wards is necessary, the Review Committee's position was that it should be achieved primarily through the combination of existing wards, although redrawing City of Toronto wards and some wards in other municipalities may be necessary.

The identification of area municipalities is preserved by respecting municipal boundaries. Metropolitan councillors would be elected from Metropolitan wards for Metropolitan Toronto purposes and would serve exclusively on Metropolitan Council. Each area municipality would contain an equal number of wards for Metropolitan Toronto purposes as its allotted number of Metropolitan councillors, as outlined in the following table:

Municipality	Existing No. of Wards	Proposed No. of Metropolitan Wards	Proposed No. of Metropolitan Councillors
Toronto	11	8	8
North York	14	7	7
Etobicoke	5	4	4
Scarborough	14	6	6
York	8	2	2
East York	4	1*	1*
	56	28	28

*One Metropolitan councillor would be elected at large in East York.

The Review Committee noted that any confusion resulting from the different sizes between the larger Metropolitan wards and the smaller area municipal wards would be offset by the fact that Metropolitan candidates would contest a separate slate of issues from those identified by local council candidates.

It is therefore recommended that:

6. **Electoral ward boundaries for Metropolitan Toronto purposes be configured to attain a population of 75,000 ± 25%, should not cross municipal boundaries and should combine existing wards wherever possible.**

5. SELECTION OF THE METROPOLITAN CHAIRMAN

As the head of the Metropolitan Council and Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan Corporation, the Metropolitan Chairman plays a very important role in the strategic and day-to-day functioning of the government. The legislated responsibilities of the Chairman include presiding over Metropolitan Council and Metropolitan Executive Committee meetings, voting on Metropolitan Executive Committee and other Standing Committees, and casting the tie-breaking vote on Metropolitan Council. In addition, the Chairman assumes responsibilities for political and administrative leadership roles which are not specifically assigned in any statute. Currently, the Chairman is the only full-time Member of the Metropolitan Council.

The Metropolitan Review Committee acknowledges the importance of the position of Chairman and does not wish to alter the Chairman's established role. However, the Review Committee believes that the existing method of selecting the Chairman does not adequately reflect the principles of accountability and representation. To this end, the Review Committee examined the models of the Provincial Task Force concerning the selection of the Metropolitan Chairman.

5.1 Models Reviewed

Three models for selecting the Chairman were studied by the Minister's Task Force; namely, appointment by Council (status quo), selection from Council (retains seat), and at-large election. These three models were reviewed by the Task Force emphasizing accountability, representation and nature of the Chairman's role (see Exhibit 4). A brief description of each model is provided below:

Appointment by Council (Status Quo): The appointment of the Chairman is provided for in subsections 10(2) and 10(5) of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. Briefly, the Act states that:

- The Metropolitan Council chooses its Chairman.

EXHIBIT 4

OPTIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE METROPOLITAN CHAIRMAN

Options	Accountability	Representation	Nature of the Chairmanship
Appointment by Council (Status Quo)	• Chairman accountable to Council • No direct electoral means for accountability to the public	• Chairman has confidence of majority of Council members • Represents only Council • Presently is open to Members of Council, the incumbent or any eligible voter	• Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer • Chairman is the only full time Member of Council
Selection from Council (Retains Seat)	• Chairman is accountable to Council, but also to the constituency which elects him to Council	• Open to Members of Council and the incumbent • Desirable that Chairman votes on all issues, but this has potential for parochialism • Uncertainty about eligibility of all Council members for Chairmanship (e.g. mayors)	• Chairman is Chief Executive Officer • Retention of a local seat requires Chairman to devote some time to constituency matters
At-Large Election	• Chairman is directly accountable to the electorate • Chairman to participate in all Council votes • May be necessary to specify by statute both the formal and informal powers of the Chairman	• Achieves one person/one vote principle • Open to any eligible voter • Costly election campaign • Electoral procedures would have to be developed	• Chairman in role as Chief Executive Officer is strengthened • Chairman may not have consensus of the Council leading to a stalemate • Additional powers may need to be introduced (e.g. appointing Metro Executive Committee) • Chairman would have great deal of political presence both across Metro and in intergovernmental affairs

- Members of the Metropolitan Council are eligible, or "any other person" may be selected.
- The Chairman must resign an elected seat if one is held, and the resultant vacancy must be filled.
- An incumbent Chairman is eligible for re-election.

Selection from Council (Retains Seat): This model provides for Council choosing its Chairman from among its own elected members. Only Members of Council would be eligible (the phrase "any other person" would no longer apply). The Chairman would retain his Metropolitan seat. The incumbent would be required to win election to the Metropolitan Council in order to be eligible for re-election to the Chairmanship. Mayors would not be allowed to run for the Metropolitan Chairman position.

At-large Election: Under this model, any qualified elector could be elected Chairman in an at-large contest across Metropolitan Toronto and would be accountable to the entire Metropolitan Toronto electorate.

5.2 Arguments Concerning the Models Reviewed

During its deliberation, the Review Committee addressed the advantages and disadvantages of the three models for the selection of the Chairman as analyzed by the Task Force, as well as the results of the questionnaire completed by Members of Council. A summary of the discussion regarding each model is presented below:

Appointment by Council (Status Quo): The current method of selecting the Chairman is dismissed because it fails to provide the Chairman with sufficient accountability to the electorate. The Review Committee stated that the position of the Chairman which provides direction on Metropolitan issues that affect a population of 2.2 million and require a budget of $1.7 billion is far too important a position to be occupied by a non-elected person. The Chairman should be an elected representative like the other Members of Council.

At-Large Election: The debate over the at-large election model produced arguments which reflected support for the highly democratic features underlying the model. As well, the Review Committee saw some positive features in the focus of power that this model would imply. The at-large election model was seen as a logical extension of the direct election of Metropolitan Council (Metro-only) model already supported by the Committee. The election of the Chairman at-large would provide accountability to the electorate across Metropolitan Toronto and would ensure the one person/one vote principle. In effect, the election of the Chairman at-large would enhance the Chairman's role as Chief Executive Officer enabling him, for example, to articulate the position of Metropolitan Council on intergovernmental affairs on behalf of the entire Metropolitan Toronto electorate, who he directly represents.

In spite of the merits of the election of the Chairman at-large model, the Review Committee expressed concern over the unparalleled amount of power inherent in such an elected position. Under at-large election, the Metropolitan Chairman would be directly accountable to the largest constituency in Canada. This preeminence, it was noted, could be achieved without the support of Council members. The Review Committee was uncertain whether the existing system of checks and balances would be sufficient to offset the enormous power and influence that could be exerted by a Chairman elected at-large. The extent of the Chairman's formal powers would have to be defined by statute. In addition, the Review Committee considered the anticipated expenses that would be incurred in an at-large election to be prohibitive. Furthermore, it was felt that the election campaign could become a popularity contest waged by wealthy candidates with the possible intervention of party politics. The Review Committee rejected the election of the Chairman at-large model because it was reasoned that this model would substantially alter the existing nature of the Chairmanship position.

Selection from Council (Retains Seat): The need for the Chairman to be an elected Member of Council in order to provide accountability prevailed throughout the Review Committee's discussion. The existing method of selecting the Chairman provides no accountability to the electorate, while the election at-large model achieves accountability, but raises several concerns as discussed above.

The selection of the Chairman from among Members of Council provides accountability both at the Council and constitutency levels. Under this model, the Chairman would be accountable to the Council which appointed him and would have the support of Council, thereby averting any potential stalemates which are possible between Council and a Chairman elected at-large. The Chairman would also remain accountable to the constituency that elected him through the retention of an elected seat. The Review Committee did acknowledge that the Chairman's retention of his seat may lead to some parochialism, as the Chairman may be confronted with balancing the views of his constituents and those of the rest of Metropolitan Toronto on some issues.

The appointment of the Chairman by Metropolitan Council also supports the federation concept of Metropolitan government used in Metropolitan Toronto. The process whereby Metropolitan Council Members, who are elected from within local municipalities, select a Chairman who is also elected locally is a way of further strengthening the co-operative effort which has characterized the functioning of Metropolitan Council. The majority of Council Members answering the questionnaire support the selection of the Chairman by Council from among their own Members (see Appendix B).

The Review Committee concluded that the model which provides for the selection of the Chairman from Council, and where the seat is retained, was the most appropriate.

It is therefore recommended that:

7. **The Metropolitan Chairman be chosen by Metropolitan Council from among its directly elected Members and that the Chairman retain his Metropolitan seat.**

5.3 Eligibility of Mayors

The Review Committee noted that under the selection of the Chairman from Council (retains seat) model, the Chairman would have to devote some of his time to the affairs of his constituents. Fulfilling both the role of Chairman and a Metropolitan representative is a formidable, but not impossible task. However, the Review Committee realizes that the mayors would experience great difficulty managing both chairmanship and mayoral duties and responsibilities at the same time. From a time perspective alone this would not be possible. In addition, balancing the views of two Councils which may be at variance would. The mayors, under a direct election (Metro-only) model, would be occupied with the responsibilities of their own local councils and from the commitment of sitting on Metropolitan Council as well. Although considerable leadership and experience would be forfeited, the Review Committee believes that the mayors of the area municipalities should be ineligible for the office of the Metropolitan Chairman. The majority of Members of Council indicated in the questionnaire a preference for the mayors to be ineligibile to serve as Metropolitan Chairman (see Appendix B).

It is therefore recommended that:

8. **The mayors of the area municipalities not be eligible to serve as the Chairman of Metropolitan Toronto.**

6. SELECTION OF THE METROPOLITAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The primary role of the Executive Committee of Metropolitan Council is to provide policy direction to Council on those issues which fall within its mandate. Under the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, the Executive Committee oversees the preparation and presentation of the budget to Council, the preparation and awarding of all contracts and tenders for materials and supplies, and the selection, compensation and dismissal of senior civil servants. The Executive Committee also assumes responsibility for reporting to Council on the operations of the Metropolitan Corporation and its Boards, Commissions and Agencies. In addition, it considers standing committee reports dealing with matters of finance, property and personnel, before they go to Council.

The Metropolitan Review Committee considered the models for the selection of the Executive Committee developed by the Provincial Task Force. In addition, the Review Committee formulated a model from the work of the Task Force. The Review Committee focused its discussion on a new means of selecting the Executive and entertained a view to formalize the responsibilities and the overall role of the Executive Committee.

6.1 Models Reviewed

The Task Force reviewed three models on the selection of the Executive Committee; namely, status quo, selection by the Chairman and selection by Council. A summary of the Task Force's analysis of the three models according to accountability, representation and relationship to Council is provided in Exhibit 5. In addition, an alternate model was put forth for consideration by the Review Committee. A brief description of each model is provided below:

Status Quo: Selection of the Metropolitan Executive Committee is provided for in Section 11 of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, which requires that the Executive Committee be comprised of fourteen members, as follows:

EXHIBIT 5

OPTIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE METRO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Options	Accountability	Representation	Relationship to Council
Status Quo	Members are not directly accountable to the Metro Chairman or Metro Council; "two classes of Metro Councillors"	All municipalities are represented in proportion to their current representation on Metro Council	Policy direction on these issues clearly within mandate of Executive Committee (budget, contracts, staff)
Selected by Metro Chairman	Members would be accountable to Metro Chairman	Does not provide for geographic representation, but could be ensured by statute	More unified group to provide leadership to Metro Council. Potential division between Executive Committee and Metro Council
Selected by Council	Members would be accountable to Metro Council	Does not provide for geographic representation, but could be ensured by statute	Executive Committee would be more compatible with Metro Council; thereby reducing possible conflict between the two

- The Metropolitan Chairman, the six mayors, the top-polling controller from Etobicoke, the two top-polling controllers from North York, the top-polling controller from Scarborough and three Metropolitan councillors from the City of Toronto, elected under Section 152a of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act.

Selection by the Chairman: This model sets out that the Metropolitan Executive Committee and its size would be required by statute. The Executive Committee Members would be selected by the Metropolitan Chairman from the Members of Council.

Selection by Council: Under this model, the Metropolitan Executive Committee and its size would be required by statute. Members of the Executive Committee would be selected by the Metropolitan Council from amongst its own Members.

Alternate Model: According to this model, the Executive Committee would be required by statute and would comprise of the Metropolitan Chairman, the six mayors, and the Chairmen of the six standing committees of Metropolitan Council.

6.2 Arguments Concerning the Models Reviewed

The Review Committee noted that the models reviewed in the Task Force Report featured attributes which would strengthen the existing role of the Executive Committee. However, these models were rejected because the Review Committee did not feel that the composition of the Executive Committee prescribed by each model would furnish the Executive Committee with a similar degree of experience and insight inherent under the alternative model.

Status Quo: The existing method of selecting the Executive Committee provides questionable accountability and offers limited representation. The Members of the Executive Committee, under the status quo, are seen to be

more accountable to their own council and local constituency than to Metro Council, to which they should provide leadership. Although the representation of all area municipalities on the Executive is ensured by statute, it must be realized that these area municipal representatives (mayors and controllers) carry the heaviest workload, at the local level. The time that these representatives can devote to Metropolitan Executive Committee affairs is potentially limited.

Due to the statutory composition of the Executive Committee, many suitable Members of Council are ineligible. This has had the effect of producing "two classes of councillors". Under a direct election of Council (Metro-only) plus Mayors system, the current method of selecting Executive Committee Members would be invalidated because no local controllers would be elected to Metropolitan Council. The status quo model was, therefore, rejected by the Review Committee.

Selection by the Chairman Under this model, the Executive Committee members would remain accountable to the Chairman who appoints them. The "two classes of councillors" distinction would be diminished because all Members of Council would be eligible to serve on the Executive Committee. The number of Executive Committee Members would be determined by statute and their tenure in office would be determined by the Chairman. Although no minimum area municipal representation would be ensured in the composition of the Executive Committee Members, the Chairman could seek a balance of area municipal interests. With its members appointed by the Chairman, the Executive Committee can operate as a unified group enhancing its leadership role to Council. However, there exists the potential for the Executive to be at odds with Council, in which case a stalemate could result.

Selection by Council: The members of the Executive Committee, under this model, are accountable to Council which appoints them. All Members of Council are eligible to serve on the Executive Committee. The number of Executive Committee Members would be limited by statute and their tenure

would be determined by Council.

The selection of the Executive Committee Members by Council ensures that the Executive operates with the support and confidence of Council to which it provides leadership. Potential conflict between the Executive and Council would be reduced, unlike the potential stalemate inherent in the selection by the Chairman model.

The Review Committee noted that both the selection by the Chairman and selection by Council models contain a number of positive features. However, the Review Committee did not view the selection process under either model as a quarantee towards the selection of those Members of Council who, as Executive Committee Members, could bring to bear, in a leadership capacity, the experience and networks of influence and confidentiality necessary to achieve a more proactive role for the Executive Committee. These models were therefore dismissed.

Alternative Model: The Task Force raised the possibility of a greater connection between the Executive and the standing committees. The Review Committee examined this relationship more closely. Under this model, the Executive Committee would include mayors who would maintain linkages with local councils, the standing committee chairmen whose responsibility it is to focus primarily on Metropolitan issues and the Metropolitan Chairman who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation. Although the model provides for geographic representation through the mayors, the Review Committee concluded that the overall concern in considering the composition of the Executive Committee is its ability to provide leadership. This role should not be limited by a perceived need to provide geographic representation. In any event, the balancing effect of geographic representation would still be provided by the composition of Metropolitan Council.

The leadership role of the Executive is strengthened under this model because it consolidates the heads of the decision-making bodies throughout the Metropolitan Corporation. The Metropolitan Chairman would be surrounded with the most active and involved Members of Council. The considerable leadership and experience of the mayors, coupled with the extensive control over information networks exerted by standing committee chairmen, enhance the leadership role of the Executive. Under this model, the Executive Committee is better equipped to assume a proactive policy formulating function instead of its often perceived image as a depository of report findings and recommendations. The inclusion of the standing committee chairmen would also provide a stronger voice for standing committees in Executive Committee affairs.

It is therefore recommended that:

9. The method of selecting the Metropolitan Executive Committee be such that it comprise the Metropolitan Chairman, the six area municipal mayors and the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of Metropolitan Council.

6.3 Term of Standing Committee Chairmen

The Executive Committee would best provide leadership to Metropolitan Council if its members sat as a unit for the full three-year duration of Council. The full term would enable members of the Executive to familiarize themselves with the issues before them and would ensure continuity and consistency of the positions taken by the Members of Executive. The length of the Executive Committee's term should parallel that of Metropolitan Council which it serves.

Under the alternative model, the standing committee chairmen, in addition to the Metropolitan Chairman and the six area municipal mayors would comprise the Executive Committee. Currently, however, standing committee

chairmen serve only one-year terms. One-year chairmanships would severely hamper and disrupt the continuity of the Executive Committee's leadership under the alternative model, with approximately one-half of its members changing each year. Considerable delays in the Executive Committee's decision-making process would be experienced as standing committee chairmen are replaced. The Review Committee, therefore, concluded that the chairmanship of the standing committees of Metropolitan Council should be changed from the existing one-year's duration to three years.

It is therefore recommended that:

10. The term of office for standing committee chairmen be changed from the existing one-year's duration to three years.

6.4 Establishment of Finance and Management Standing Committees

Under the current system, both the Budget and Management Sub-Committee are sub-committees of the Executive Committee. The Budget Sub-Committee is responsible for the preparation and presentation of the budget of the Metropolitan Corporation and other related financial matters. The Management Sub-Committee is responsible for approving Program Reviews of Metropolitan Departments, Boards and Commissions and all personnel matters and related issues.

Given the growing magnitude and complexity of the budget of the Metropolitan Corporation, the Review Committee concluded that more time and focus was necessary to review and analyze the budgets now being brought forward by Metropolitan Departments, Boards and Commissions, than is currently possible. The Review Committee believed that a Finance Standing Committee, whose Members would be devoted exclusively to reviewing budget and financial matters, could provide the necessary time and focus. Similarly, the Management Sub-Committee, whose primary role has been related to personnel and staffing issues, has recently expanded its role to include Program Reviews, would be replaced by a Management Standing Committee.

The Review Committee, therefore, concluded that the existing functions of both the Budget and Management Sub-Committee would basically continue, but both sub-committees would become standing committees of Council. The chairmen of these committees would then become Members of the Executive Committee which would then be comprised of fifteen members (the Metropolitan Chairman, six mayors and eight chairmen of standing committees).

It is therefore recommended that:

11. **Metropolitan Council establish two new standing committees of Council; a Finance Committee and a Management Committee to replace the Budget and Management Sub-Committees of the Executive Committee.**

7. RELATIONSHIP OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS TO METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

Some of the most important municipal services provided to the residents of Metropolitan Toronto, such as police protection and transit services are delivered by boards and commissions (special purpose bodies). These special purpose bodies have been delegated, through statute, the responsibility for either narrowly defined program, regulatory or management functions and enjoy varying degrees of autonomy from Council. By virtue of the number of special purpose bodies and their impact on policy-making and financial planning in Metropolitan Toronto, the Review Committee considered the review of the relationship between special purpose bodies and Council vital to the overall study of the structure of the Metropolitan government.

The central issue in the Review Committee's discussion of special purpose bodies concerns the appropriate degree of Council control. The Review Committee identified that, in many instances, the existing relationship between the special purpose bodies and Council is unbalanced, in terms of the amount of Council representation on the special purpose bodies, relative to Council's financial contribution.

7.1 Models Reviewed

The provincial Task Force examined three models regarding Council's control over special purpose bodies; namely, status quo, greater board independence and greater Council control. The Task Force analyzed the three models in regards to accountability, representation and Council control (see Exhibit 6). The three models are briefly described below:

Status Quo - Covers the broad range of relationships existing between Council and its Boards and Commissions. This includes boards that are clearly "municipal", such as the Licensing Commission; "hybrid" boards, such as the Metropolitan Toronto Library Board and Children's Aid Societies, in which several bodies have an interest and "provincial/municipal" boards, such

EXHIBIT 6

OPTIONS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING RELATIONSHIPS OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS TO METRO COUNCIL

Options	Accountability	Representation	Council Control
Status Quo	• Ranges from Boards reporting to Council through Standing Committees to no reporting to Council (e.g. Board of Police Commissioners) • Unclear whether Council's interests are represented due to mixed membership • Council is recognized as primarily responsible for Board actions	• Majority of Board members are appointed by Council • Not all appointees are members of Council • Appointed Council members and citizens do not always represent Council's view	• Budgetary control ranges from limited to considerable • Council reviews and approves capital expenditures of Boards for its own borrowing purposes • Boards have their own staff with independent personnel policies
Greater Independence for Boards	• Boards not required to report to Council, remain open to public scrutiny • Council not identified as responsible for Boards • Council only appoints or reappoints members	• Council members ineligible to sit on Boards • Board members would all be citizens • Board size, composition and term of office for members would be established in legisiation • Council members freed up of any Board duties	• Council has no control over budgets • Boards would continue to have separate staffs and personnel policies
Greater Council Control	• Boards directly accountable to Council • Boards to provide Council with more access to information • Council to establish general policies for Board operations	• Council to determine size and composition of Boards under its jurisdiction • Council to make all Board appointments • Council to determine term of office of members and limit individual members' length of office	• Council to review in detail and approve annual operating and capital budgets • Provide integrated administrative and personnel policies with Metro Departments • Council to approve hiring of Chief Officials of Boards

as the Police Commission, in which the Province has a major interest.

Greater Independence - The responsibilities of special purpose bodies are entirely separate from those of Council. Special purpose bodies would not report to Council and would comprise of only non-elected persons.

Greater Council Control - This model is based on the philosophy that the elected municipal council should be the major force at the local level. If special purpose bodies are to be continued, their activities should be performed under the clear direction and control of Council. Rather than having a set of independent special purpose bodies, as in the second model, there would be a unitary system, whereby the Metropolitan Boards and Commissions clearly would serve much like the Departments of the Metropolitan Corporation.

7.2 Degree of Council Control

The degree of Council control over both the programs and budgets of special purpose bodies needs to be rationalized. The Review Committee viewed the status quo and greater independence models as a continuation of the existing diffuse control that Metropolitan Council has over its special purpose bodies.

The existence and large number of special purpose bodies contributes towards the fragmentation of priority setting and policy-making throughout Metropolitan Toronto. This fragmentation results in the weakening of both accountability and responsiveness between Council and the electorate. Although Council is often perceived by the public to be responsible for service delivery, it does not have the authority in many cases to exert complete control over the special purpose body providing the service. Co-ordination of service delivery becomes difficult when the program falls under the jurisdiction of several special purpose bodies. Decision-making becomes diffuse and responsibility for service delivery unclear.

EXHIBIT 7

1986 Gross and Net Expenditures* Including Capital Financing for Metro Departments, Boards and Commissions ($000's)

Departments	1986 Metro Gross Expenditures	% of Metro Gross Expenditures	1986 Metro Net Expenditures	% Metro Net Expenditures
General Government	33,799.3	2.2	26,672.3	3.2
Roads and Traffic	72,801.4	4.7	55,010.9	6.6
Works	142,249.3	9.3	34,089.8	4.1
Ambulance	44,003.5	2.9	19,641.8	2.4
Community Services	483,772.1	31.5	88,999.9	10.7
Parks and Property	39,557.8	2.6	20,102.2	2.4
Planning and Development	3,465.8	0.2	3,357.3	0.4
Sundry	85,354.4	5.6	85,354.4	10.2
Sub-Total	905,003.6	59.0	333,227.6	40.0
Boards and Commissions				
Licensing Commission	5,289.7	0.3	969.4	0.1
Police Commission	376,154.7	24.5	327,960.4	39.4
Conservation Authority	10,905.3	0.7	10,905.3	1.3
Toronto Transit Commission	180,467.3	11.8	103,104.9	12.4
Children and Family Aid Societies	14,284.1	0.9	14,284.1	1.7
Metro Zoo Board	12,397.6	0.8	12,397.6	1.5
Metro Library Board	20,033.4	1.3	20,033.4	1.4
Exhibition Place Board of Governors	4,542.1	0.3	3,893.2	0.5
O'Keefe Centre	841.2	-	306.7	-
Guild Inn	177.3	-	177.3	-
Convention and Visitors' Association	5,831.3	0.4	5,831.3	0.7
Sub-Total	630,924.0	41.0	499,863.6	60.0
Total	1,535,927.6	100.0	833,091.2	100.0

* 1986 Estimates

Special purpose bodies appropriate large sums of the Metropolitan Corporation's finances. In 1986, sixty percent of the Metropolitan Corporation's net expenditures were for Metro's Boards and Commissions with the Police Commission (39.4%) and the Toronto Transit Commission (12.4%) accounting for a total of fifty-two percent, as shown in Exhibit 7. The Metropolitan Corporation's financial contribution to special purpose bodies covers a considerable portion of their expenditures. In 1986, forty-six percent of the total expenditures for boards and commissions was subsidized by the Metropolitan Corporation, as illustrated in Exhibit 8. Five of Metro's special purpose bodies; namely, the Metropolitan Library Board, Board of Commissioners of Police, Metropolitan Zoo Board, Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority and the Metropolitan Toronto Convention and Visitors' Association receive the majority of their funding from the Metropolitan Corporation.

In light of the importance of the functions administered by special purpose bodies and the magnitude of financial commitment by the Metropolitan Corporation to these organizations, the Review Committee believes that the greater Council control model would be the most appropriate model to adopt. The model would provide for greater accountability and responsiveness between the various Boards and Commissions and Council than currently exists. In addition, there would be greater co-ordination for the provision of municipal services for which the Metropolitan Corporation is deemed responsible and provide more effective financial control for the delivery of those services.

It is therefore recommended that:

12. **the Metropolitan Council adopt the principle that special purpose bodies of the Metropolitan Corporation be more accountable to the Metropolitan Council.**

EXHIBIT 8

Metro Toronto's Contribution[1] to Boards and Commissions in 1986 ($000's)

Boards/Commissions	1986 Estimated Total Gross Expenditures[2]	Other Revenues[3]	Other Revenues as a % of Total Expenditures	1986 Estimated Total Net Expenditures (Metro's Share)[2]	Metro's Share as a % of Total Expenditures
Licensing Commission	5,289.7	4,320.3	81.7	969.4	18.3
Police Commission	376,154.7	48,194.3	12.8	327,960.4	87.2
Conservation Authority	21,720.6	10,815.3	49.8	10,905.3	50.2
Toronto Transit Commission	515,146.0	412,041.1	80.0	103,104.9	20.0
Children and Family Aid Societies	71,885.3	57,508.3	80.0	14,284.1 [4]	20.0
Metro Zoo Board	17,208.2	4,810.6	28.0	12,397.6	72.0
Metro Library Board	22,258.9	2,225.5	10.0	20,033.4	90.0
Exhibition Place Board of Governors	35,412.3	31,519.1	89.0	3,893.2	11.0
O'Keefe Centre	6,739.8	6,433.1	95.4	306.7	4.6
Guild Inn	4,252.2	4,074.9	95.8	177.3	4.2
Convention and Visitors' Association	8,066.8	2,235.5	27.7	5,831.3	72.3
Total	1,084,134.5	584,178.0	53.9	499,863.6	46.1

NOTE:

1. 1986 Estimates.
2. Gross and net expenditures are consolidated and include capital financing.
3. Other revenues include operating revenues, provincial grants and sundry revenues.
4. Children and Family Aid Societies' revenues as reported here, do not totally offset gross expenditures due to adjustments.

7.3 Review of Special Purpose Bodies

In its deliberations, the Review Committee addressed three issues of concern respecting special purpose bodies. These issues were: the membership of special purpose bodies, the number of special purpose bodies, and the administrative procedures used by special purpose bodies. In the spirit of the previous recommendation, the position of the Review Committee was that these issues merited further study.

Membership of Special Purpose Bodies

The position of the Review Committee was that those special purpose bodies which receive a large share of their funding from the Metropolitan Corporation should be brought under closer fiscal scrutiny of the Metropolitan Council. To this end, the Committee believed that the membership of the Board of Directors of special purpose bodies should be enlarged and that their composition include a greater number of Council Members.

In some cases, Council appoints both Members of Council and citizens to the Board of Directors of the Boards and Commissions. This provides for some redistribution of the workload to non-elected appointees. However, under a direct election (Metro-only) plus mayors Council system, Metropolitan representatives would be involved on a full time basis with Metropolitan issues. This would allow for more members of Council to sit on boards and commissions, thereby strengthening the representation of Council in Board and Commission operations.

Number of Special Purpose Bodies

At the present time, there are eleven Boards and Commissions of the Metropolitan Corporation. The Review Committee expressed the view that not all these special purpose bodies need necessarily remain as such, as there was the potential to more closely integrate them into the Metropolitan Corporation as departments, thereby reducing their number.

Administrative Procedures

The Review Committee expressed the view that the administrative procedures used by special purpose bodies regarding tendering and proposal calls, as well as rules of procedures for the conduct of public meetings, should be reviewed and made more clear. The procedures of the Boards and Commissions would become more like those utilized by Metropolitan departments.

The Review Committee did not have adequate time to sufficiently debate these issues. Notwithstanding, the Committee's view was that detailed review of each special purpose body should be undertaken within the context of these issues and should follow the submission of the Review Committee's response to the Minister.

It is therefore recommended that:

13. the Metropolitan Council authorize the Metropolitan Review Committee to undertake an in-depth analysis of special purpose bodies to include, but not be limited to, the following areas:

(a) an increase in the membership of those bodies which take up a large portion of the Metropolitan budget, with a majority of the members being Members of Council;

(b) the potential for reducing the number of special purpose bodies by integrating them into the Metropolitan Corporation;

(c) a review of administrative procedures relating to tenders and proposal calls and rules of procedure for the conduct of public meetings; and

(d) submit recommendations thereon to Council.

The Review Committee acknowledged the work of the Task Force on Functional Relationships of the Council, Committees, Boards and Commissions[1], respecting Council control over special purpose bodies. In summary, the recommendations of this Task Force provide Council with greater access to information concerning the activities and initiatives of special purpose bodies. Although the Review Committee supports the relevant Task Force recommendations[2], the order of change contemplated by the Review Committee would require more extensive modification to the legislation than that proposed by the Task Force.

There is a long and documented history of Metropolitan Council's desire to strengthen its role with its special purpose bodies. Many representations have been made to the Provincial Government in this regard in the past. It is essential, at this point, that the Province assure Metro of its co-operation in strengthening its role with its Boards and Commissions.

Upon completion of the Review Committee's detailed review of the special purpose bodies, the Review Committee should meet with the Minister of Municipal Affairs and his staff and identify the legislative changes necessary to give effect to any recommended modifications concerning Council's desired relationship with special purpose bodies.

It is therefore recommended that:

14. **The Minister of Municipal Affairs be requested to meet with the Metropolitan Review Committee for the purpose of discussing Council's recommendations on Council's desired relationship with special purpose bodies and jointly identify the legislative changes to give effect thereto.**

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1 Task Force on Functional Relationships of the Council, Committees, Boards and Commissions, Report, June 1985.

2 The recommendations of the Task Force on Functional Relationships of the Council, Committees, Boards and Commissions were approved by Council on February 18, 1986.

8. CHANGES REQUIRED TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO ACT

The Review Committee concluded that, should the recommendations in this report be adopted in whole or in part, implementation would require changes to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. In addition, Metropolitan Council has requests outstanding with the Provincial government with respect to changes regarding the composition of the Toronto Transit Commission and the Board of Commissioners of Police.

Appendix C outlines the principal amendments to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act which would be necessitated by the adoption of the recommendations contained in this report. Further review may indicate a need for additional amendments to the Act or other Provincial legislation, as well as amendments to the Metropolitan Procedural By-law, in order to give effect to the recommendations. The Review Committee was concerned that upon adoption of the recommendations by Metropolitan Council, sufficient commitment be assured by the Provincial government to carry out implementation of the changes with some expediency.

It is therefore recommended that:

15. **Metropolitan Council authorize the Metropolitan Review Committee to meet with the Minister of Municipal Affairs, to discuss the recommendations contained in this report and jointly identify and review the legislative changes required to give effect thereto.**

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE
ON
OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
METROPOLITAN TORONTO

1. **Selection of Metropolitan Council**

Please check one of (a) (b) or (c)

(a) I support the indirect method of determining membership on Metro Council (Metro Council members serve by virtue of their election to office at the local level (mayors and controllers) and the balance is selected by area councils from among their own members) ( )

(b) I prefer a method of direct election to Metro Council. ( )

(i) If you checked (b), should Metro Council (check one):
- include the Mayors ( )
- exclude the Mayors ( )

(ii) If you checked "include the Mayors" please indicate your preference below:
- The mayors should not be eligible to serve as Metro Chairman) ( )
- The mayors should not be eligible to serve on Metro committees. ( )
- The mayors should not have their authority limited. ( )

*Please check either (iii) or (iv).

(iii) I prefer that Metro Council members serve only on Metro Council. ( )

(iv) I prefer a joint seat (dual representation where members sit on both Metro and local councils) method of election to Metro Council. ( )

If you checked (iv) please check one of the following:
- The joint seat representative should have full authority on both councils. ( )
- The joint seat representative should have limited authority on the local council (e.g. not eligible to serve on the Executive Committee of local council). ( )

(c) I prefer some other method of determining membership on Metro Council as follows: ( )

_____

_____

2. Electoral Boundaries

		AGREE	DISAGREE
For Metro Council Election purposes:			
(a)	The boundaries of Metro electoral wards should not cross municipal boundaries.	( )	( )
(b)	Should reconfiguring of existing electoral ward boundaries be necessary for Metro purposes, it should be accomplished by combining existing wards wherever possible.	( )	( )
(c)	Should reconfiguring of electoral ward boundaries be necessary for Metro purposes, it could be accomplished by redrawing existing ward boundaries.	( )	( )
(d)	The proposed federal and new provincial electoral districts in the Province of Ontario allow a population variation of ±25% from the average of all electoral districts in the Province and greater variation in extraordinary circumstances. Do you believe that the variation allowed in determining Metro's electoral boundaries should (check one):		
	• reflect the variation above (i.e. ±25%).	( )	
	• reflect a lesser variation than above, and if so, what should be the amount of variation.	( ) (%)	

(e) Under what circumstances should a greater variation in population (i.e. greater than 25%) be allowed, when devising Metro electoral boundaries.

_____

_____

_____

(f) Other electoral boundary issues:

_____

_____

_____

3. **Metropolitan Council Size**

(a) Which of the following sizes is the most appropriate for Metro Council (check one):

Metro Council Size	Approximate Representation by Population	
22	1:100,000	( )
28	1:75,000	( )
43	1:50,000	( )
Other?	_____	( )

(b) Should representation by population be calculated by (check one):

including the Mayors ( )

excluding the Mayors ( )

	AGREE	DISAGREE
(c) Given a change in the selection and/or size of Metro Council, the size of local councils must remain the same.	( )	( )

Comments:

_____

_____

_____

_____

(d) Other comments on the size of the Metropolitan Council:

_____

_____

_____

_____

4. Selection of the Metro Chairman

Please check one of (a) (b) or (c)

(a) I support the present method of selecting the Chairman. ( )

(b) I prefer that the Chairman be selected by Metro Council from among its members. ( )

(c) I prefer that the Chairman be elected at large (i.e. across all of Metro). ( )

(d) Other comments:

_____

_____

_____

_____

5. Selection of the Metro Executive Committee

Please check one of (a) (b) (c) or (d)

(a) I support the present method of selecting the Metro Executive Committee as spelled out in the Metropolitan Toronto Act. ( )

(b) I prefer that the Chairman select the Metro Executive Committee. ( )

(c) I prefer that Metro Council select the Metro Executive Committee. ( )

	AGREE	DISAGREE
(d) Should members of the Executive Committee be eligible to serve as Standing Committee Chairmen.	( )	( )

(e) Other comments:

_____

_____

_____

Completed by: _____

APPENDIX B

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE
TO
METRO COUNCIL MEMBERS
ON
THE OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
METROPOLITAN TORONTO

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES ON METRO COUNCIL	NUMBER OF RESPONSES RECEIVED	%
TORONTO	12	9	75
NORTH YORK	10	10	100
ETOBICOKE	5	4	80
SCARBOROUGH	7	6	86
YORK	3	3	100
EAST YORK	2	2	100
	—	—	—
TOTAL	39	34	87

QUESTION NO. 1

SELECTION OF METRO COUNCIL

		NUMBER	%
(a)	INDIRECT	11	32
(b)	DIRECT	23	68
(c)	OTHER METHOD	0	0
		34	100

QUESTION NO. 1 (CONT'D.)

ANALYSIS OF
DIRECT ELECTION RESPONSES

			NUMBER	%
b	(i)	INCLUDE MAYORS	21	91
		EXCLUDE MAYORS	2	9
			23	100
b	(ii)	THE MAYORS SHOULD NOT		
		BE ELIGIBLE TO SERVE AS METRO CHAIRMAN	16	62
		SERVE ON METRO COMMITTEES	4	15
		HAVE THEIR AUTHORITY LIMITED	6	23
			26	100

QUESTION NO. 1 (CONT'D.)

ANALYSIS OF
DIRECT ELECTION RESPONSES

			NUMBER	%
b	(iii)	SERVE ONLY ON METRO COUNCIL	10	43
b	(iv)	SERVE ON BOTH METRO AND LOCAL COUNCILS (JOINT)	13	57
			23	100

THE JOINT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD HAVE

FULL AUTHORITY ON BOTH COUNCILS	7	54
LIMITED AUTHORITY ON LOCAL COUNCILS	6	46
	13	100

QUESTION NO. 2

ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES

			NUMBER	%
a)	DO NOT CROSS MUNICIPAL	AGREE	30	94
	BOUNDARIES.	DISAGREE	2	6
			32	100
b)	COMBINE EXISTING WARDS.	AGREE	26	84
		DISAGREE	5	16
			31	100
c)	REDRAW EXISTING WARDS.	AGREE	22	73
		DISAGREE	8	27
			30	100
d)	± 25% variation		21	66
	less than ± 25% variation		11	34
			32	100
	5%		2	
	10%		5	
	15%		2	
	20%		1	
			10	

QUESTION NO. 2 (CONT'D.)

ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES

e) WHEN SHOULD A VARIATION IN POPULATION GREATER THAN 25% BE ALLOWED?

- SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. (3)
- TO PROVIDE MINIMUM REPRESENTATION FOR YORK AND EAST YORK (5)
- SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN HIGH GROWTH WARDS.

f) OTHER COMMENTS ON ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES:

- CITY OF TORONTO SHOULD KEEP ITS PRESENT NUMBER OF WARDS.
- ANNEXATION OF YORK AND EAST YORK BY CITY OF TORONTO WOULD RESOLVE MANY ELECTORAL ISSUES.
- ELECTORAL WARDS THAT ARE TOO LARGE WOULD NOT FACILITATE TRUE REPRESENTATION AND WOULD INVOLVE THE COST OF ESTABLISHING CONSTITUENCY OFFICES AND STAFF.

QUESTION NO. 3

SIZE OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

a)

COUNCIL SIZE	APPROX. REP. BY POPULATION	NUMBER	%
22	1:100,000	3	9
28	1:75,000	18	55
43	1:50,000	10	30
OTHER		2	6
		33	100

b) REPRESENTATION BY POPULATION SHOULD:

INCLUDE THE MAYORS:	16	48
EXCLUDE THE MAYORS:	17	52
	33	100

QUESTION NO. 3 (CONT'D.)

SIZE OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

c) HOW DOES A CHANGE IN SIZE OF METRO COUNCIL AFFECT THE SIZE OF LOCAL COUNCILS?

- THE SIZE OF LOCAL COUNCILS IS PARTLY A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF WARDS AND WHETHER METRO REPRESENTATIVES STILL SERVE LOCALLY.

- LOCAL COUNCILS SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 25%. (3)

- LOCAL COUNCILS SHOULD NOT INCREASE IN SIZE AND A DECREASE IN SIZE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER DIRECT ELECTION WHERE METRO COUNCILLORS NO LONGER SERVE LOCALLY.

- METRO SHOULD PAY FOR ITS OWN COUNCILLORS IN FULL UNDER DIRECT ELECTION.

- COUNCILS MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM ALL THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THEM. (2)

- EXISTING WARD BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO PRESERVE COMMUNITY IDENTIFICATION.

QUESTION NO. 3 (CONT'D.)

SIZE OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL

d) OTHER COMMENTS ON SIZE OF METRO COUNCIL:

- EFFECTIVE COUNCIL SIZE IS 25 TO 30 MEMBERS. (3)

- CITY OF TORONTO SHOULD BE REORGANIZED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WARDS SO THAT THE REST OF THE MUNICIPALITIES NEED FEWER REPRESENTATIVES FOR METRO SEATS. (2)

- THE 1:50,000 RATIO WHICH CLOSELY REFLECTS REPRESENTATION FOR THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT METRO.

- PREOCCUPATION WITH COUNCIL SIZE IS SELF-SERVING.

- A LARGE LEGISLATURE IS APPROPRIATE FOR A GOVERNMENT AS LARGE AND COMPLEX AS METROPOLITAN TORONTO.

QUESTION NO. 4

SELECTION OF THE METRO CHAIRMAN

		NUMBER	%
(a)	CURRENT METHOD OF SELECTION	11	32
b)	SELECTED BY METRO COUNCIL FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS.	22	65
c)	ELECTED AT LARGE	1	3
		34	100

QUESTION NO. 4 (CONT'D.)

SELECTION OF THE METRO CHAIRMAN

d) OTHER COMMENTS ON SELECTION OF METRO CHAIRMAN:

- THE ELECTION AT LARGE OF THE CHAIRMAN IS UNREALISTIC. (4)

- PRESENT METHOD PROVIDES STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY WHILE CHAIRMAN SELECTED BY METRO COUNCIL PREVENTS THE CHAIRMAN FROM SERVICING CONSTITUENTS AND AN AT LARGE ELECTION IS OF BENEFIT TO WEALTHY CANDIDATES.

- IF SELECTED BY METRO COUNCIL, THE CHAIRMAN MUST RETAIN HIS/HER SEAT. (2)

- CHAIRMAN SHOULD HAVE METRO COUNCIL EXPERIENCE.

QUESTION NO. 5

SELECTION OF THE METRO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

			NUMBER	%
a)	CURRENT METHOD OF SELECTION.		13	41
b)	SELECTED BY CHAIRMAN.		2	6
c)	SELECTED BY METRO COUNCIL		17	53
			32	100
d)	EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO SERVE AS STANDING COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN	AGREE	11	35
		DISAGREE	20	65
			31	100

QUESTION NO. 5 (CONT'D.)

SELECTION OF THE METRO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

e) OTHER COMMENTS RE SELECTION OF METRO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

- EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS SHOULD CHAIR STANDING COMMITTEES.

- UNDER DIRECT ELECTION, THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED AND ITS DUTIES REDISTRIBUTED TO STANDING COMMITTEES AND PERHAPS TWO COMMITTEES (E.G. FINANCE AND PERSONNEL).

- EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SHOULD COMPRISE OF:
  - CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEES
  - CHAIRMAN OF BUDGET SUB-COMMITTEE
  - METRO COUNCIL CHAIRMAN

  EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SHOULD SIT AS THE MANAGEMENT SUB-COMMITTEE.

- IF METRO COUNCIL IS REDUCED IN SIZE, THEN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SHOULD ALSO BE REDUCED. (2)

APPENDIX C

AMENDMENTS TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO ACT NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RESPONSE TO THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO*

*The following outlines the principal amendments to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act which would be necessitated by the adoption of the recommendations of the Metropolitan Review Committee. Further review may indicate a need for additional amendments to that Act or other Provincial legislation, and amendments required to the Metropolitan Procedural By-law to give effect to the recommendations.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO ACT

R.S.O. 1980, c. 314

Section 5 (1): Amend to provide for the following composition of the Metropolitan Council:

the Borough of East York	-	2 members
the City of Etobicoke	-	5 members
the City of North York	-	8 members
the City of Scarborough	-	7 members
the City of Toronto	-	9 members
the City of York	-	3 members

(2) maintain inclusion of mayors;

- amend to provide for direct election of members of the Metropolitan Council;
- amend to provide that representatives chosen by the electorate sit only on the Metropolitan Council.

(3) repeal

(4) repeal

(5) amend to provide that the Metropolitan Chairman is to be elected from among the directly-elected members of the Metropolitan Council.

- add provision that mayors not eligible to be elected chairman.

Section 6 (1) Consider repeal of requirement that the first meeting of the Metropolitan Council be held after those of the area municipalities;

(3) repeal, (except in respect of mayors), the requirements that members file certificates of qualification from the clerks of the area municipalities;

(4) repeal

(5) amend to co-ordinate with s.6 (3)

(6) consider amendment of number of members necessary to deem the Council to be organized (present number: 11)

Section 8 (1) amend provision to provide for new quorum (present quorum: 11).

Section 9 (1) amend term of office provision to accommodate direct Metropolitan-only election.

Section 10 (2) amend procedure for filling vacancy in the position of Metropolitan Chairman to remove possibility of electing a non-member of Council;

(3c), 3d), 3E) amend to relate declarations of vacancy to direct Metropolitan-only election of members of the Metropolitan Council;

(4) amend provision for filling of vacancies;

(5) repeal provision that a member elected as Metropolitan Chairman resign from elected position on area municipal council, and substitute provision that Metropolitan Chairman retain elected position as well as position as Chairman.

Section 11

(1) amend to provide for composition of the Executive Committee to include:

(a) the Chairman;

(b) the mayor of each area municipality;

(c) the chairman of each standing committee of the Metropolitan Council appointed for the term of Council;

- consider possible specific or maximum number of standing committees and possible definition of same;

(2) repeal;

(4) provide for quorum of the Executive Committee (present: 6 members on 14-member Committee);

(5) consider removal of incorporation by reference of S.71(3) of the Municipal Act, which requires a 2/3 vote of Council to overturn certain recommendations of the Executive Committee in respect of appropriations or expenditures;

- consider review of powers of the Executive Committee;

(6) repeal;

(7a) repeal;

- consider new enactment to provide for Metropolitan wards and elections:

(Reference to Municipal Act, s13), Municipal Elections Act.

Section 100 (1) Amend to provide for the composition of the Toronto Transit Commission to be increased to seven members appointed by by-law of the Metropolitan Council;

(3) amend to provide for staggered terms;

(4) amend to provide for minimum number of members on the Commission;

(7) consider repeal of requirement of 2/3 vote for appointments to the Commission.

(Refer: Recommendation 12 and previous requests by the Metropolitan Council.)

Sections 152 & 152a: Consider possible consequent amendments relating to the composition of the councils of area municipalities.

Section 177 (1) amend to provide for the composition of the Metropolitan Board of Commissions of Police to be increased to seven members, with one additional member being appointed by the Province and one by Metropolitan Council.

(Refer: Recommendation 12 and previous requests by the Metropolitan Council.)